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ABSTRACT: 
When estimating a specification combining different influences on local public choice, 
three public issues of different ideological attributes were compared for two periods of 
Portuguese local government intervention: the beginning and the ending of one electoral 
cycle. The most exciting results of the paper are the significance of ideology at local 
level and the decline of its importance in the ending of the electoral cycle. There is also 
some evidence on the political influence of interest groups, especially in low visible 
issues. On the general issue, majority is also influent and fiscal illusion is found. Some 
preliminary panel data results including two electoral cycles are analyzed.   1
1 – Introduction 
 
The empirical literature about local government intervention has been incorporating the 
theoretical developments of Public Choice literature. The simple median voter model 
was the first step on the substitution of “ad hoc” specifications for theoretical grounded 
models. However, the evidence produced on fiscal illusion revealed that majority is not 
completely decisive in the democratic political market. The development of interest 
group theory (political power of minorities) opened new paths in the study of local 
public choice. Finally, the understanding that also supply agents may have some 
discretionary political power, created a more realist platform of theoretical tools for the 
construction of empirical works. In this paper, after presenting a summary of some 
theoretical developments, I estimate for the Portuguese municipalities an empirical 
specification that combines those referred types of influence. The regressions were 
estimated for the beginning of one electoral cycle (post-electoral politics) and for the 
ending of the same electoral cycle (pre-electoral politics). Some comparisons between 
the two situations were analyzed. The paper ends with some conclusions and some clues 
for future research.  
 
2 – Theory 
 
Before the seventies, the economic empirical literature about local government public 
choice was built in an “ad hoc” basis. The researchers tested several variables that they 
believed that would explain local government expenditure without a theoretical basis 
that could justify the choice of the explanatory variables. However, during the fifties, 
the abstract Samuelsonian public good literature had to face the social choice problem 
raised by Arrow (1951). It generated a lot of research incorporating politics in 
explaining collective choice. Since then, theory has given attention to real public choice, 
instead of optimal public choice. The work of Downs (1957), departing from the 
thinking of Bowen (1943) and of Black (1948), gave a great impulse on the empirical 
study of democratic local public choice.  
   2
According to Downs, under the political rule of simple majority (50%+1) and under 
some restrictions, median voter would be decisive in the political market. Her demand 
for public goods would be the demand of the community. This result holds mainly in 
the case of direct democracy, when only two proposals (or candidates) are competing. 
But, admitting that politicians are trying to maximize votes and that voters are well 
informed, the result also fits in representative democracy
1. Empirically, the econometric 
regressions that traditionally are specified to estimate the local demand for public goods 
(or local government expenditure) according to the median voter hypothesis include the 
median values in community (median tax-price and median income). During the 
seventies, a lot of empirical median voter literature was produced, claiming a theoretical 
basis, against the ancient “ad hoc “ literature. Pommerehne and Frey (1972) and 
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) compared the new specification to the “ad hoc” 
estimation and concluded that median voter regressions are more powerful in explaining 
local public choice. Two other basilar empirical works about the median voter 
hypothesis are Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). 
They are precursors of hundreds of articles applying the median voter hypothesis
2. 
Despite, its success, the median voter hypothesis was very much criticized during the 
seventies and the eighties, because of its strong assumptions (single peaked preferences, 
unidimensional political issue, voters information is perfect, only two competitors) and 
because it is specially shaped for the case of direct democracy. Nevertheless, it is a case 
of success in economic empirical literature and it was the first step in providing a 
theoretical basis for the estimation of the local public demand for public goods. 
 
The excessive simplicity of the median voter hypothesis left room for competing 
approaches that does not depend so much on restrictive assumptions.  
 
The strongest challenge to the credibility of the median voter hypothesis is the 
assumption of perfect information of voters. Buchanan (1967) recovered the problem of 
                                                 
1 When more than two candidates are competing, if they colligate, forming two coalitions, the result also 
holds.  
2 For a review see Bahl (1980), Holcombe (1989), Cruz (1998). Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) are 
well-known papers that incorporate the median voter hypothesis.   3
fiscal illusion that had been pointed by Puviani (1903). Wagner (1976), Oates (1979, 
1985) and Nelson (1986) tested empirically the existence of fiscal illusion and they 
could not reject it. One of the consequences of fiscal illusion is the “flypaper effect”
3. 
This phenomenon has been exhaustively tested and there is evidence on its non-
rejection
4. As a consequence, the median voter model began to include explanatory 
variables to capture the fiscal illusion hypothesis
5. Theoretically this means that the 
median voter isn’t completely decisive: the preferences of “someone else” affect public 
choice. The economic analysis of fiscal illusion was a second step in the direction of a 
more realistic theoretically based specification of community’s demand for local 
government intervention. 
 
However, the consequences of abandoning the assumption of perfect information were 
not restricted to the introduction of fiscal illusion. Gathering for information implies 
costs that the individual pays if she gets some benefits in exchange. Those benefits 
depend on individual’s interests (what she cans gain or loose with public choice). As a 
matter of fact, different individuals have different interests, so it’s rational to admit that 
some individuals are better informed than others. Olson (1965) referred that individuals 
are members of different interest groups (do not act individually in political market) and 
their information about political proposals depend on the groups they belong to. Tullock 
(1967) and Krueger (1974) indicated that different groups (with different resources) 
compete to capture benefits from the government (“rent-seeking”), causing strong 
deadweight losses in economy. Niskanen (1971) pointed out that bureaucrats are better 
informed than voters about the costs of public provision, and they use their “power” 
according to their interests. Stigler (1974) and Posner (1975) emphasized the interaction 
between government regulation and interest groups. Becker (1983) formalized the case 
of imperfect competition in the political market. All these referred works initiated 
several paths of research in public choice giving a renewed consistence to the 
                                                 
3 The effect of additional unconditional grants (given to local governments) on increasing local public 
expenditures is stronger than the same increment in the income of the population of the community. 
4 Bailey and Connolly (1998) reviewed the literature about the “flypaper effect”. 
5 Some examples are: Turnbull (1987); Islam and Choudhury (1989); Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994); 
Turnbull and Mitias (1995); Gemmell, Morrissey and Pinar (2002).    4
enlargement of the theoretical basis that could justify various of the “ad hoc” variables 
jointed together in the models in the category of “specific demand characteristics of 
communities”. However, interest group theory is not so precise as the median voter 
theory in indicating which explanatory variables should be included to measure the 
influence of different demand groups
6. Congleton and Shughart II (1990), Shapiro and 
Papadakis (1993), Baumgardner (1993), Congleton and Bennett (1995), Ahmed and 
Greene (2000) are some examples of papers combining the median voter hypothesis 
with the interest group hypothesis. The development of the interest group theory was a 
third step in improving the theoretical basis in the study of local public choice. 
 
From the exposed it is clear that the demand side in the political market has been deeply 
explored in literature, but it is also important to ask if the supply side does not play a 
role in local public choice. The special influence of bureaucracy (information about 
costs and control of agenda) is one kind of supply side action
7. Another possible 
influence comes from the ideological and the idiosyncratic preferences of politicians. 
Median voter hypothesis states that competing candidates tend to the position of the 
median voter (center), mitigating their ideological differences. So, despite the fact of 
departing from a perfect knowledge about the ideological positions of all voters, the 
median voter theorem concludes that ideology is not important, because competition 
attracts candidates to the center, forcing them to leave their ideological positions. In the 
interest group hypothesis, ideological interests can be represented as any other demand 
interests. Among groups of many types, there are ideological groups, whose influence is 
represented, for example, by the number of voters in left wing and in right wing parties. 
Another way of giving ideology a role is by analyzing the differences in local public 
choice provoked by the differences in the ideological preferences of the elected 
politicians. Indeed, the empirical studies about local public choice that combine 
economic factors and ideology are not numerous, specially in the case of local political 
                                                 
6 In the empirical literature of interest group political influence it is possible to find several ways of 
measuring the power of groups (number of members, level of resources, number of interventions in 
media, amount of contributions to candidates in elections); for a review of the empirical interest group 
literature see Potters and Sloof (1996). 
7 It can be represented as the “agent” in relation with the “principal” (elected politicians), but public 
officials are also an important group of voters in the demand side of the political market.   5
market, where decisions are not so much of “ideological type” as in the case of central 
government. Hug (1995) sustains that because of the threat of entry of new parties, 
some ideological differences between competitors do not disappear. According to the 
author, ideology should be considered in the empirical studies. Paldam and Skott (1995) 
also point that proposals are not empty of ideology because they have to be approved 
inside parties: the median voters of the ideological groups (parties) may be influential. 
Levitt (1996) studied the vote of senators in the USA combining economic and 
ideological influences, which were not rejected. Gemmell, Morrissey and Pinar (2002) 
applied the median voter model, and introduced dummies to capture the influence of 
different political preferences in local public choice
8. 
 
There is also a large amount of literature about the influence of political interests in the 
determination of opportunistic political cycles. According to this literature, it is 
expected that elected politicians are not so interested in following the preferences of 
their ideological supporters in the pre-election moment as in the post-election moment. 
In the pre-election moment, in order to broader political support, politicians try to please 
other groups than their ideological supporters. As a consequence, on political issues 
with ideological attributes, in the post-election moment, it is expected a higher 
correspondence between the ideological preferences of the political rulers and public 
choice than in the pre-election moment, when the preferences of voters and interest 
groups tend to be attended. 
 
The admission in the estimation of ideological and political influences is a fourth step 
for a more complete rational understanding of local public choice. 
 
3 – The equation of influences 
 
                                                 
8 In the Portuguese case it makes sense to include ideological preferences, because political parties 
support almost all candidates to local elections (in the period analysed in this study, all elected local 
politicians were support by political parties).   6
The specification of the regressions estimated in this study includes the four steps 
referred in the above section: median voter hypothesis, fiscal illusion, interest group 
hypothesis and ideological preferences. 
 
i)  “Pure” median voter model 
 
The objective is to explain local public output, but normally this is something that it is 
not possible to measure. So, like almost every applications of the median voter model, 
in this study the dependent variable is the “per capita” local government expenditure. 
 
E   =   q   G           ( 1 )  
where E is the value of the public output, G is the real output and q is the unit cost of G.  
 
If the publicly provided good is a “pure” public good everyone consume the same 
amount of the good (G), if there is complete rivalry in its consume each individual 
consumes (G/N), being N the total population in the community. Admitting that the 
median voter is decisive, her demand is: 
 
gm = G N
-α    (0  ≤  α  ≤   1 )         ( 2 )  
where gm is the median voter’s demand of the public good and (1/N
α ) is the traditional 
congestion function used by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973)
9. If α  is equal to 0, there 
is non-rivalry; if α  is equal to 1, the good is private; with α  between 0 and 1 the good is 
“mixed”. 
 
From the utility maximizing consumer theory, the demand of the median voter is
10: 
 
gm = K ym
a pm
b   with (a > 0 and b < 0)           (3) 
                                                 
9 This congestion function was tested against many alternatives, but none had a better performance; see 
Cruz (1998) for a review. 
10 Assuming a Cobb-Douglas demand function.   7
where ym is the median disposable income, pm is the median voter tax-price and a and b 
are the demand income elasticity and the demand price elasticity respectively. K is a 
constant. 
 
From (1) and (2) and considering expenditure “per capita” (e = E/N): 
 
e = K ym
a pm
b N
α -1          ( 4 )  
 
The unit cost of the public good associated with the demand of the median voter is the 
ratio between the total cost of the public output (1) and the demand of the median voter 
(2): 
q G / G N
-α  = q N
α           ( 5 )  
 
The median voter tax-price depends on the median tax-share (tm = Tm/T, being Tm the 
local tax paid by the median voter and T the total tax revenue in the community). So the 
median voter share of the unit cost of the public good is: 
 
pm = tm q N
α            ( 6 )  
 
Admitting that the unit cost of G (q) does not vary among communities
11 and 
substituting (6) in (4): 
 
e = K ym
a tm
b N
α  (1+b) –1        ( 7 )  
 
The most difficult problem of the empirical estimation of the median voter model is the 
inclusion of the variable tax-share. As a matter of fact, generally it is not possible to 
find statistics about median voter tax-share and, in addition, local revenues come from a 
wide range of fiscal fonts (property taxes, construction taxes, vehicles circulation tax, 
                                                 
11 Almost all empirical studies include this simplification, because of lacks of information about 
differences in the production costs of public goods among communities; see in Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973) some conditions for the assumption holds. Borcherding and Deacon (1972) is one of the few 
exceptions that does not impose this assumption.   8
other types of taxes). For simplicity I assume that all voters (adults) are local taxpayers 
and that they equally share the local tax burden
12. If NA is the number of adults 
(taxpayers) in the community, the median tax-share is (tm = 1/NA). Assuming this 
definition, it is possible to separate the tax-share into two effects: 
 
tm = (1/N) (N/NA)           ( 8 )  
 
The greater is N, the lower is tm. The greater is N relatively to NA the greater is tm, 
because a larger part of the population is not a taxpayer. Defining (N/NA) as θ  and 
incorporating (8) in (7): 
 
e = K ym
a θ
b N
(α  - 1)  (1 + b)          ( 9 )  
 





ii) Fiscal  illusion 
 
If voters underestimate the tax-price, their choice will not be based on pm, but on the 
perceived tax-price π m [π m = f (pm)]. The “flypaper effect” literature indicates that one 
important font of fiscal illusion is the level of unconditional transfers that communities 
receive from higher levels of government (in continental Portugal, from central 
government). If these transfers are perceived as being lowering tax-prices, then the 
higher is the weight of unconditional transfers relatively to the tax payments of the 
people of the municipality to central government, the higher is the demand for public 














η , with U being 
                                                 
12 Many median voter applications follow Borcherding and Deacon (1972) in considering that the 
population of each community equally share local taxes.   9
unconditional transfers given to the community and I being the taxes collected by the 
central government in the municipality. It is possible to find in the literature other ways 
of defining the fiscal illusion influence, for example the relationship between non-
transferred local revenue and the total revenue of local government. Letting R being the 
total local revenue, the level of independence from unconditional transfers of the 















η . We would expect that lower “per capita” expenditure is 
associated to higher proportions of local revenues, but it can also express a stronger 
ability of municipalities to collect local revenue and, in consequence, more ability of the 
municipality to generate “per capita” expenditure. Due to this mixed effect I think the 
first measure is preferable. 
 
The perceived tax-price is: 
 
π m = η
c pm    with  (c  >  0)       (10) 
 
Substituting the real tax-price by the perceived tax-price π m (that really drives median 
voter choice) in (4) and considering the subsequent transformations that originated (9): 
 




(α  - 1) (1 + b)          ( 1 1 )  
 
iii) Interest  groups 
 
Interest group influence is an expression of differences in communities’ tastes and 
organization. Their pressure on one political issue varies with the number of interested 
members, with the intensity of their interest, with their level of information, with their 
resources and the costs of exerting pressure. The choice of the relevant interest groups 
that shall be included in the regressions depends on the issues being politically decided. 
So, there is always an “ad hoc” element in the inclusion of this kind of political 
influence. I consider a vector of interest groups (xi) in (11). 
   10




(α  - 1) (1 + b) xi
d 
(d < 0 or d > 0, depending on the interests of groups)        (12) 
 
iv)  Ideological and political influences 
 
The measurement of ideology is not an easy task. The usual proxy is the number of 
votes obtained by the more ideological candidates in elections. One alternative, 
especially if the objective is to apprehend the supply side influence (ideological and 
political influences of elected politicians), is to see if there are significant differences 
between communities when the elected candidates come from the most ideological 
parties. It is possible to include ideological and political influences in (12) in the form 
of a vector of variables (sj). 
 




(α  - 1) (1 + b) xi
d sj
e        ( 1 3 )
 
(e < 0 or e > 0, depending on the political and ideological preferences of political rulers) 
 
Expressing in logarithmic form: 
 





4 – Proceedings and data 
 
The main goal of this paper is the understanding of public choice in Portuguese 
municipalities. I am especially interested in analyzing the behavior of the ideological 
variables, because there has been a hot discussion among political science researchers 
about the ability and the will of elected candidates in putting ideology into political 
action. The development of Public Choice literature enables economic science to 
provide some contribution on the study of this topic. Of course the municipal public   11
choice has not the same ideological nature of the parliamentary choice. However if, at 
this level, it is found some evidence about ideological influence, this contribution is an 
additional flame on the topic. 
 
Ideology is considered in the left – right dimension. For some of the political issues 
studied in the paper it is assumed that left wing parties desire a higher level of public 
intervention (more public expenditure) and right wing parties wish the lowering of 
public intervention (lower levels of public expenditure). In the period of the analysis, 
there were four political parties competing in municipal elections that were elected in at 
least one Portuguese municipality. Two of these parties have little ideological 
differences between them and are generally positioned in the center of the ideological 
distribution (social democrat party - PSD; socialist party - PS)
13. One of the other two is 
a left wing party (communist party – PCP/CDU) and the other is a right wing party 
(popular party – CDS/PP)
14. The voters in the communist party evidence a stronger 
ideological fidelity (that is sustained even in municipal elections) than the voters in the 
other parties that can be apprehended by the correlations between the 1993 results of 
municipal elections and the results of the parliamentary elections held in 1991 and in 
1995. They are extremely high for the communist party (0,91 in both cases) and none of 
the other parties evidence correlations higher than 0,78. 
 
The equation (14) is estimated for two moments in the electoral cycle: the beginning 
(post-electoral moment - 1995) and the ending (pre-electoral moment – 1997). This 
procedure allows apprehending differences in the politicians’ behavior in different 
moments in the electoral cycle. In addition, to the direct comparison of the results of 
both regressions, the detection of the political cycle effect may be reinforced by the 
                                                 
13 Since 1974 (after dictatorship), each of these parties got more votes in all Portuguese elections than the 
others competitors. In the municipal elections held in December of 1993 they wan in 178 municipalities 
from a total of 224 municipalities included in regressions. Despite the fact of in 1995 and in 1997 (years 
of analysis) Portugal Continental (the study does not include the ultramarine municipalities) being 
divided into 275 municipalities. 51 municipalities were not included in the study because they were in 
one of the following situations: some of the four political parties running in the 1993 municipal elections 
colligated between themselves (41 municipalities); there was no data in at least one of the variables 
included in the regressions (10 municipalities). 
14 In the 1993 municipal elections, CDS won in 11 of the 224 relevant municipalities and PCP won in 35 
municipalities.    12
Chow test. If the behavior of elected politicians does not change between the post-
election moment and the pre-election moment, the hypothesis that the two regressions 
(estimation of equation (14) in two moments of the electoral cycle) are equal shall not 
be rejected. If the Chow test hypothesis is rejected, an indication of rulers’ political 
influence raises. 
 
In this study three different public issues are analyzed. Firstly, I consider one general 
political issue – current municipal intervention – that aggregates a bundle of public 
services, each of them being weakly perceived by the generality of voters. However, the 
whole package is the most relevant dimension of people’s vote. For this issue, I expect a 
combination of significant influences: median voter (suffering from fiscal illusion), 
interest group and ideology. The regressions on this issue include one interest group – 
building sector. I hypothesize that this is an influential group in municipal decisions, 
because a large part of the municipal intervention is related to the provision of goods 
and facilities that increase the value of property. Building sector is interested in higher 
levels of provision of such public goods and facilities. On the other hand, municipalities 
are interested in pleasing building activities, because they are the most important local 
font of government revenue. 
 
Secondly, I include a specific issue that normally is less visible to the median voter (and 
to the generality of voters) and also less ideological, but that may also be under the 
lobbying of the building interest group – urban residuals treatment
15. 
 
Finally, the third political issue is the local public intervention in cultural activities
16. I 
expect that the median voter (the generality of citizens) is not informed about local 
public choice on this issue (each of the cultural activities is produced and consumed by 
specific interested minorities), however, interest groups and political groups are 
interested in higher levels of public provision (everyone pay, and minorities benefit – 
                                                 
15 The substitution of the public provision of this service for private provision may be associated to 
ideological preferences, but in the period of analysis there was not private provision of this service in any 
of the municipalities. 
16 Sports are not included.   13
“common pool” problem). In relation to ideology, there’s an old and classical division 
between left and right on this issue. For left wing parties the provision of cultural 
activities is a classic obligation of the state; for right wing parties there are other 
priorities in government intervention: the private sector is the “natural” provider of 
those services. I am interested in analyzing the behavior of Portuguese parties on this 
issue, at local level. 
 
The data
17 used in the paper cover 224 Portuguese Continental municipalities, in a total 
of 275
18 in 1995 and in 1997. I estimate cross-sectional regressions on the three issues, 
using WLS. I use two dummies to catch the political influence of politicians: RIGHT – 
takes value 1 if the municipality is ruled by politicians that were supported by CDS, 0 
otherwise; LEFT – 1 if the municipality is ruled by politicians that where supported by 
PCP, 0 otherwise. The inclusion of the two dummies allows capturing differences in 
relation to CENTER – when PS or PSD supported the elected politicians that rule the 
municipality
19. Table I shows the variables that I enclose in the regressions. All 










                                                 
17 Data for dependent variables, median voter variables (except “per capita” level of purchase power) and 
interest group variables is from the Regional Statistic Year-Book of 1996 and of 1998, published by the 
Statistical National Institute (INE). Data on the “per capita” level of purchase power was collected from 
Studies about Municipal Purchase Power 1995 and 1997, published by INE. Political data is from 
Elections National Committee (CNE). 
18 c. f. note 13. 
19 I also estimated the regressions separating PS from PSD (third dummy) and the results were not 
significantly different from those presented in next section: PSD was never significant, but 
multicollinearity was higher. The same occurs when PS is the third dummy.   14
Table I – Variables included in the regressions 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION  COMMENTS  TAXONOMY  SIGNS 
A) DEPENDENT V.         
Current intervention of 
municipalities 








Urban residuals treatment  Municipal “per capita” 









supported by municipalities 
Municipal “per capita” 








B) EXPLANATORY V.          
1) MEDIAN VOTER         
Median tax-share (θ )  Ratio between population in the 
municipality and population 
older than 15 years old 
There is no data on 






Median income (ym)  Municipal “per capita” level of 
purchase power (mpcpp) 
It is assumed that the 
distribution of mpcpp is a 
good proxy to the 










Population (N) – (α )  Population in the municipality  α  is the congestion 
parameter; values 








2) FISCAL ILLUSION (η )  Municipal current revenue 
minus current unconditional 











3) INTEREST GROUPS         
Building sector (x1)  Revenue from the tax on the 
transfer of real estate (the 
structure of the tax is equal in all 
municipalities) weighed by 
disposable income of the 
municipality  
Value of property 
transactions in the 
municipality weighed by 








Cultural Group (x2)  Number of libraries, museums, 
publications and radio stations in 











4) IDEOLOGY         















(-)   15
 
The X2 statistic is the result of the White test of heteroscedasticity. The weight variable 
of WLS is INCOME. I assume that the variance of the squared errors depends on the 
square of the INCOME. In the municipalities with higher income, the budget restriction 
is not so intense in influencing the choice between private and public provision, so it is 
expected a higher dispersion of the errors variances in richer municipalities. In the 
municipalities with lower purchase power, more frequently the public intervention is the 
only option for the community to enjoy the goods (this might be the case of generality 
of cultural goods and services). 
 
The FPolitics is the result of the Wald test to the political dummies (LEFT; RIGHT)
20. 
 
5 - Results 
 
In table II are the results of the WLS estimation of the current municipal intervention 
regressions. The specification performs well; the estimated coefficients of the variables 
are generally significant for the required level of confidence, with the expected signs. 
As expected, on this general issue results indicate that the interest group and the 
majority influence “per capita” current expenditure. The income demand elasticity is 
low (smaller than unity). This result is similar to the results of other studies about the 
local demand for public choice. The price elasticity exhibits a higher value than what is 
found in other empirical studies. This result might be explained by the separation of the 
fiscal illusion effect (also statistically significant with the expected sign). If fiscal 
illusion is mixed in the price elasticity, it is natural to find a lower value for the price 
elasticity. However, Gemmell, Morrissey and Pinar (2002) isolated the fiscal illusion 
effect and found smaller values for price elasticity in British counties. The results also 
show that local government intervention exhibits congestion in consumption, what is in 
harmony with the generality of the empirical literature about local public choice. One 
reason for a value of α  greater than unity might be the exhaustion of scale economies in 
addition to the congestion effect. Comparing the 1995estimated regression with the 
                                                 
20 The Wald test was applied after correcting heteroscedasticity.   16
1997 regression for the median voter and interest group variables it is possible to see an 
increase in fiscal illusion and in lobbying influence in the end of the electoral cycle. In 
relation to the political – ideological variables, they exhibit the expected signs: LEFT is 
significant for 95% of confidence in 1995 and in 1997, but RIGHT is not significant in 
1997. The Wald test to the political variables is significant for 95% of confidence in 
1995 and in 1997. These results indicate that the local governments ruled by left wing 
politicians are more intervenient in local economy.  
 
Table II – Results of CURREXP regressions 


































2  0,75 0,72 
F 193,63  162,91 
FPolitics  9,82*** 3,53** 
X2  15,99*** 29,88*** 
SAMPLE 224  224 
α   1,315 1,20 
*** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99%; ** Statistically significant for a level of 
confidence of 95%; * Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 90%; t values in parentheses 
   17
In table II it is also possible to see that the elasticity of LEFT falls when the following 
elections are closer. Surprisingly, from these results, we can conclude that ideology 
matters in municipal public choice, especially after elections. Ideological influence is 
weaker when the electoral cycle finishes. This might mean that politicians are trying to 
enlarge their dominium of voters, moving for less ideological preferences. The Wald 
test corroborates this behavior. Even though, results show that LEFT wing mayors 
always maintain some ideological choice. 
 
Table III – Results of URBRESID regressions 


































2  0,38 0,36 
F 16,47  13,27 
FPolitics  3,23** 3,38** 
X2  7,18 6,61 
SAMPLE 224  224 
α   1,033 1,037 
*** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99%; ** Statistically significant for a level of 
confidence of 95%; * Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 90%; t values in parentheses 
   18
Generally, the two regressions perform well and in harmony with what was expected. 
Urban residuals treatment is a private good without a strong ideological character. The 
median voter variables are significant and their estimated coefficients exhibit the 
expected signs, but the fiscal illusion variable in not significant. This is not unexpected, 
because the variable used to capture the fiscal illusion effect measures the independence 
of the municipality in terms of its own fiscal revenues in relation to unconditional 
grants. Although the relation between the global level of local provision (enclosing all 
issues) and the degree of independence of the municipality from unconditional transfers 
is expected, at the level of one specific issue, it is perfectly admissible that the relation 
does not exist. The government can spend the unconditional transfers with other types 
of provision. If there is fiscal illusion on this issue, it is more probable that it might 
come from the non-existence of a specific tax directly related to the provision of these 
services. However, in this context, a surprise is the high value of the price elasticity, 
because it indicates that voters strongly react to changes in price, what would be natural 
if voters were informed about the tax-price. The influence of lobbying on this issue is 
also unclear, because the interest group variable is significant in 1995, but not in 1997 
(both estimated coefficients with the expected sign). 
 
The ideological variable LEFT is not significant (expected result), but the variable 
RIGHT is significant (unexpected result). It seems that, on the contrary to what I 
expected, ideology also plays a role on this issue. As a matter of fact, the Wald test to 
the political dummies are significant for 95% of confidence in both years, indicating 
that the influence of ideology might be relevant. It would worth to know why right wing 
municipalities spend less in the provision of urban residuals treatment than those that 
are ruled by center parties. In the period considered all local governments provided 
these services, so the explanation to this result cannot be found in the choice of local 
rulers between private and public provision. However, it could be in the possibility of 
local authorities to sub-contract with cheaper private entities. More research on this 
topic is required. 
 
Finally, the CULTURE results are described in table IV.   19
 
Table IV – Results of CULTURE regressions 


































2  0,21 0,19 
F 9,79  8,46 
FPolitics  13,61*** 5,49*** 
X2 7,60  12,89 
SAMPLE 224  224 
α   0,986 1,036 
*** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99% 
** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 95% 
* Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 90% 
t values in parentheses 
 
The overall quality of the adjustment is not high, however the results are interesting. 
Firstly, as expected, majority seems not to be influent on this issue. Price is the only 
significant variable among the median voter variables (expected sign) and its elasticity 
is very much high. Cultural services are not usually considered as essential as other type 
of local public intervention, so when the relative price rises, combining with the 
possibility of private provision (the result of α  is “private good”), a strong reaction to   20
the price might be natural. Secondly, as expected, the cultural interest groups (interested 
minorities) influence public choice on this issue. Finally, the Wald test on the political 
variables is significant for a level of 99% of confidence in both years. Combining this 
result with the results of the estimated coefficients of LEFT and RIGHT, it is possible to 
see that LEFT ideological preferences are significant in the cultural issue. The results do 
not indicate that the municipalities ruled by right wing politicians spend less on cultural 
services than those that are ruled by the center parties, but there is evidence on higher 
local public intervention of LEFT elected politicians. The comparison of the elasticity 
of LEFT between the regressions indicates that the political influence on the local 
expenditure in the cultural issue is weaker in the pre-election moment than in the post-
election period. One possible explanation to the phenomena is the existence of political 
cycle on this issue. 
 
As was referred in section 4, the Chow test may provide some information about 
changes in the behavior of politicians between the post-electoral and the pre-electoral 
periods. In table V are the Chow test results. 
 
According to the results showed in Table V, the hypothesis of equal specifications in 
1995 and in 1997 is rejected in the CURREXP and in the CULTURE regressions and it 
is not rejected in the URBRESID regressions. These results are coherent with the 
hypothesis of opportunistic political cycle on the issues with ideological attributes (the 
general issue current expenditure and the cultural issue). Combining the Chow test 
results (Table V) with the estimation results of the regressions, for these issues (Table II 
and IV), there is some evidence on the weaker influence of politicians’ ideology in the 
pre-election moment than in the post-election moment. In order to solidify this 
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Table V – The Chow test results 




*** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99% 
** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 95% 
* Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 90% 
 
6 - Conclusions 
 
In this paper I estimate an empirical specification, based on the theoretical propositions 
of public choice theory, which are able to apprehend the influence of median voter, 
fiscal illusion, interest groups and ideology in local public choice. All conclusions 
depend on the theoretical contents and also on the assumptions of the theoretical body. 
The regressions were estimated for three municipal issues of different nature. One is a 
general issue – current intervention of local government – that is apprehended by the 
generality of voters (fiscal illusion discounted), by interest groups and that I hypothesize 
to be open to the ideological influence of elected politicians. The second issue – urban 
residuals treatment – is not ideological, and might not be so visible to the generality of 
voters. The third issue – local public expenditure with cultural services – is not 
perceived by the generality of voters, but I believe it is under the lobbying of interest 
groups and under the influence of the ideological preferences of elected politicians. 
 
The regressions were estimated for Portuguese municipalities in 1995 (the middle of 
one electoral cycle – post-election moment) and in 1997 (the ending of the electoral 
cycle – pre-election moment). The results for the issue represented by current 
expenditures indicate that ideology matters at the municipal level. This is an interesting 
and somewhat unexpected result. Majority (median voter) influences local public 
choice, but also interest group and the ideological preferences of the rulers of the 
municipalities. Local government intervention is a “normal good”, but, discounting the 
significant fiscal illusion, it evidences strong price elasticity. From the results it is also   22
possible to see that in the pre-election moment the ideological influence weakens and 
the lobbying influence and fiscal illusion increase. This might be an indication of 
political cycles on municipal ruling. 
 
The results on urban residuals treatment are not conclusive. Despite the non-existence 
of a specific tax to finance the provision of the service, the price effect is strong, but 
fiscal illusion is not significant. It seems that majority is informed about the tax-price of 
this issue. In addition, the interest group included in the regressions is influential in 
1995, but not in 1997. Finally, despite the low ideological nature of this issue, I found 
some ideological influence in right wing municipalities: they significantly spend less on 
the issue than center ruled municipalities. According to the Chow test there is no 
evidence of political cycle on the expenditure with urban residuals treatment. Due to the 
non-ideological nature of this issue, this result was expected. 
 
On cultural expenditures the results are curious. As expected the issue is not visible to 
the majority of voters (INCOME is not significant for 5% of significance), but the price 
effect is strong. Maybe a general belief on the non-essentiality of this type of 
intervention might explain this result. As expected, cultural interest groups (interested 
minority) are influential and left wing municipal rulers effectively spend more on this 
type of services than the elected politicians that were supported by center and right wing 
parties. According to the Chow test there is some evidence on the existence of 
opportunistic political cycle on the cultural issue. 
 
The interpretation of these results is obviously restricted by the defined assumptions, by 
the use of proxies and by the lack of data on the measurement of the really output of 
government. It is in progress the use of panel data ranging two electoral cycles and the 
use of an additional political issue - capital expenditure (it is expected more political 
discretionary power on this issue). 
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7 – Panel Data – Preliminary Results  
 
A panel data on two electoral cycles is being tested. It includes two pre-election 
moments (1997 and 2001) and two post-election moments (1995 and 1999). The 
number of municipalities with the required data is smaller (from 224 to 182) but it still 
includes a large part of the population of 275 municipalities. This fact and the 
plausibility of some relationship between the individual effects and the explanatory 
variables justify the hypothesis of individual (municipalities) fixed-effects. The 
estimation method is GLS with Cross Section Weights and the t tests are reported from 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Variance.  
 
Missing data in some cases and a deep reflection in others led me to introduce some 
changes in the explanatory variables. The substitution of municipal purchasing power 
by “per capita” household income and the moving back of museums and libraries from 
the cultural interest group variable are explained by missing data on the original 
variables. The use of the first definition of fiscal illusion described in section 3-ii 
(instead of the second one)
21 is due to the mixed effect associated to the original 
variable (see 3-ii). The inclusion of the dummy variable DIN (if the actual mayor was 
also the mayor in the last legislature - incumbent) can be justified by hypothesizing a 
more efficient and an electoral more independent action of experienced mayors 
(expected signal -). The incumbent experienced a learning process and has some 
advantages in competition because her image is well known among voters. As a matter 
of fact, normally she needs not so much public action proposals (expenditure) to 
conquer votes as her competitors. CGP (if the elected mayor was supported by the party 
that is ruling central government) tests the hypothesis of some positive influence 
(expected signal +) of central government rulers favoring the political affinity of 
mayors. Finally, a third dummy variable is included to apprehend the existence of 
opportunistic political cycles (PRE, if the year is a pre-election moment – expected 
signal +). 
 
                                                 
21 Now the expected signal is positive (+).   24
The specification was estimated for two additional issues: “per capita current 
expenditures minus local public officials wages”; and “per capita” capital expenditure. 
Public official wages were retired because it is not easy to change their level according 
to opportunistic preferences (lifetime contracts, monitoring of Accounting Court), so it 
is expected that opportunistic cycles be better apprehended when this item is removed. 
“Per capita” capital expenditure is one issue in which we might expect a significant 
influence of CGP, because central government frequently supports part of local 
government investments. If the number of local investments increases because of the 
participation of central government, capital local expenditure will also grow up. 
 
The results of the panel data estimation are in table VI. 
 
The panel data results on the general issues (“per capita current expenditure” with and 
without public official wages) are quite different from the cross section results (“per 
capita” current expenditure). The specification fits well to data in both estimations. In 
the panel data the tax price is not statistically significant and the variable LEFT is 
significant but exhibits a negative influence on “per capita” expenditure. The fiscal 
illusion, income, population and interest group influences remain significant with the 
expected signals. Accordingly to what was expected, but on the contrary to the previous 
results, it seems that this generic issue is not ideological at municipal level. Both LEFT 
and RIGHT municipalities spend less than municipalities ruled by center parties. One 
explanation may be found in the results obtained for the variable CGP, whose statistical 
significance and the positive signal (as expected) indicate that mayors elected by the 
same party that is governing the country spend more than the other mayors. DIN is 
significant with the expected negative influence. On the supply side of the political 
market, these results reveal that on this issue the ideological influences are not so 
important as political motives. The positive and significant influence of PRE, once 
again points to the existence of opportunistic political cycles. 
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F (WEIGHTED)  281302,0***  74645,14***  20273,31***  1214,675***  865,247*** 
Cross section indiv  182 182  182  182 182 
Total observations
22 727  727  727  727  728 
*** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99%; ** Statistically significant for a level of 
confidence of 95%; * Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 90%; t values in parentheses; 
individual fixed effects are not reported. 
 
                                                 
22 In the municipality “Batalha” there is no data on the real state tax revenue, so there is one observation 
missing in the regressions that use the interest group of construction. The municipality remains in the 
sample, because it is one of the few that are ruled by a right wing mayor.   26
The results on “per capita” capital expenditures are relatively to the current expenditure 
results, but the influence of tax price is significant and negative (as expected) and LEFT 
is not significant. It is interesting to note that the elasticity of the variable that expresses 
the coincidence between the party of the mayor and the party elected for central 
government elections (CGP) is significant and higher in the case of capital expenditure 
than in the case of current expenditure. It reveals some political discrimination in the 
central government relationship with municipalities. The influence of the construction 
interest group is also higher on this issue. 
 
For urban residuals treatment the main difference between the cross section results and 
the panel data results is the non-significance of tax price in the panel data. The price 
elasticity was surprisingly high in the cross section estimation and now is not 
statistically different from zero. The fiscal illusion influence is significant but negative. 
Nevertheless it is not expected fiscal illusion on this issue, because, after 1997, in most 
municipalities people are informed about the price of these services, which are paid 
jointly with the water invoice. LEFT is not significant and RIGHT is significant with 
negative influence on “per capita” expenditure with urban residuals treatment. This 
result expresses some ideological influence on the issue. 
 
Excluding the cultural issue, DIN is always significant and negative, giving some 
support to the hypothesis of efficiency gains from experience in the job or to the 
hypothesis of more independence of incumbents in relation to the electorate.  
 
The cultural expenditure results of the panel data are quite similar to the results of the 
cross section estimation. Ideology strongly influences the cultural municipal 
expenditure in Portugal. In addition cultural interest groups, political discrimination and 
fiscal illusion deviate the local public choice on this issue from majority preferences. 
However, politicians believe that there is some political visibility on this issue because 
PRE shows some evidence on opportunistic political cycle in cultural public choice. 
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In all issues LEFT ruled municipalities spend less than center ruled municipalities. In all 
issues opportunistic political cycling is found. 
 
It should, however, be noted that the panel data analysis is very preliminary, and it is 
necessary to test the adequacy of the fixed effects option and to produce a structure test 
between the panel pre-election and the panel pos-election. In addition, as soon as the 
2003 municipal statistics are published, it will be possible to introduce another electoral 
cycle in the analysis. 
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